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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

x

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LINDA PETERSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900222-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a corrected judgment of conviction
of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), entered after a jury verdict finding
appellant guilty of second degree murder, a first degree felony
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990).1

This court

has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).

The judgment for a lower category of homicide was entered by the
district court under the sentencing discretion provided for in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990): "If the court, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which
the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character
of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that category of offense
established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may,
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment
of conviction for the next lowest category of offense and impose
sentence accordingly."

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

In order to establish a prima facie case sufficient

to survive appellant's motion to acquit, was the State required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense?
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's

determination that appellant's stabbing of her victim was not
justified by self-defense?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1:

Whether self-defense is an element of a prima

facie case of second degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203 (1990) is a question of law, see State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211
(Utah 1985), which this court reviews for correctness with no
deference to the trial court.

State v. Wilcox, 152 Utah Adv.

Rep. 7, 8 (Utah Jan. 25, 1991).
Issue 2:

The jury's verdict must be sustained if there

is any evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, from
which findings of all the elements of the crime can be made
without a reasonable doubt.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 289

(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990).

In the

context of the issue as presented in this appeal, the court must
affirm appellant's conviction unless the evidence showing a lack
of self-defense justification, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt about whether Appellant killed in selfdefense.

See State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989);

State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
see also State v. Puran, 772 P.2d 982, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
-2-

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Linda Petersen, was charged with second
degree murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(b) or (c) (1990) (R. 22). At the close of the
State's case-in-chief, her counsel made a motion for acquittal
(Transcript 461-464), claiming that the defense need not go
forward unless the State had proved the absence of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The motion was denied (T. 469-71),

and the defense went forward.
Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder by
the jury on March 16, 1990. At sentencing on April 18, 1990, the
trial judge granted appellant's motion to reduce the conviction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) to the next lower
category of criminal homicide, manslaughter proscribed by Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), and to impose sentence accordingly.
This appeal is thus from a judgment of conviction for
manslaughter, a second degree felony, for which appellant was
sentenced to one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R.
; Corrected Judgment and Commitment).

Notice of appeal was

filed on April 18, 1990 (R. 138), after final disposition of
appellant's post-trial motions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Linda Petersen and Michel Bertrand lived together in
her Layton, Utah home from January through May 1989, when he
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moved out at her request, and again from early July through
August 1989 during a period when they agreed to get back together
(T. 565). There were problems in the relationship during this
latter period:

Petersen and Bertrand had discussed the

possibility of him moving out again because he was not providing
financial support or any kind of help to the household (T. 538).
Betrand was upset by a custody and visitation dispute he was
involved in (T. 531), and Petersen had decided he was using her
to get back at his former wife (T. 569).
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on September 1, 1989,
Petersen was doing yardwork when Bertrand returned home with his
four-year-old daughter, Tiffany, for a weekend visitation (T.
535), his first in several months because of the custody dispute.
Petersen finished her yard chores, and Bertrand took his daughter
to the supermarket and brought back chicken and beer (T. 537).
Petersen then took a bath while Bertrand put his daughter to bed
by lying down with her; Petersen felt "crummy" because Bertrand
did not come and talk to her before doing so (T. 537).
Petersen went to the lower level of the split level
home and began doing some work (T. 539). At about 11:00 p.m.,
Petersen called the home of her former boyfriend and talked to
his eighteen-year-old son, Richie Toponce, sounding a "little bit
upset" and not "in the best of moods" (T. 68). She told Richie
she wanted to tell his father, who was not at home, the good news
that she had joined the Navy reserves (T. 67). After the call,
Petersen, who had been drinking (T. 75, T. 539), called a cab to
take her to the Toponce residence in Sunset, Utah, where she knew
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Richie was the only one home (T. 584), She left Bertrand a note
(T. 539) on the kitchen counter telling him she "[w]ent to a
friend's to party" (T. 260; Plaintiff's Ex, 22). Petersen then
put some baby doll pajamas, her makeup, a backgammon board, a
bottle of rum (T. 540), and a few cans of beer in a plastic
grocery sack (T. 70) and went with her dog outside to sit on the
steps and wait for the taxi (T. 541).
Bertrand came out of the house, and Petersen told him
o
she was going to a friend's house (T. 581). He didn't want her
to go, and he slapped her (T. 581), something he had never done
3
before (T. 543). She could not remember if she slapped him back
(T. 582). The dispatched cabbie, Jay Sevy, drove by Petersen's
home at about lis30 p.m. and saw a man slapping a woman who was
trying to get away (T. 45). The cabbie drove past Petersen's
house a half a block and then turned around and went back when he
realized that his fare had called from the house where the fight
was going on (T. 47). The couple was still there when Sevy
stopped the cab in the middle of the street in front of the
Petersen house (T.48).

The man went up the stairs and into the

house (T. 48).

2
Petersen was not sure if she told him it was an ex-boyfriend's
house or just a friend's (T. 581).
3
According to Petersen, Bertrand had never done anything violent
toward her (T. 532). On the other hand, Kay Olson, a friend who
lived next door, had seen Petersen, agitated after one or two
alcoholic drinks, turn and hit Bertrand and kick him in the
groin, telling him to go into another room (T. 647). Petersen
had, in her friend's estimation, a quick temper aggravated by
alcohol (T. 651).
-5-

Sevy helped Petersen get her dog and her sack of
belongings into the cab (T. 51). Her hair was in disarray and
her face was puffed up like she'd been crying (T. 52). She
opened a can of beer from out of her sack and then threw it away
when Sevy insisted (T. 51).
The cab arrived at the Toponce residence at about 11:45
p.m. (T. 69), and Petersen took her dog and belongings inside and
paid Sevy with a check (T. 52). She did not say anything to
Richie about problems at home (T. 71). She sat down and watched
television with him, and then they began playing backgammon and
drinking rum and cokes for the next 2h to 3 hours (T. 71-72;
546).

About halfway through the first backgammon game, Petersen

left the room and made a phone call.

At first Richie could not

hear well enough to understand what Petersen was saying, but as
her voice got louder and more argumentative he heard her say she
wanted the person on the other end (who Richie assumed was her
boyfriend) to leave and leave the house keys on the table or
counter (T. 72-73; 88-90).

She returned to the living room area

and told Richie she was tired of Bertrand freeloading off of her
(T. 73).
During the next two hours, Petersen and Richie played
backgammon and drank the bottle of rum, becoming quite drunk (T.
74-75; T. 546). Petersen went into one of the bedrooms and
emerged in her baby doll pajamas and eventually she and Richie
engaged in sexual intercourse (T. 77). Some time afterwards,
Petersen began to feel sick and Richie fetched a bucket (T. 77).
At approximately 3:00-3:30 a.m., she asked him to call a cab to

-fi-

•take her home (T. 77). She got her clothes back on and fell
asleep on the couch.
When the cabbie, Dean Steeley, arrived about twenty
minutes later, Richie answered the door and then went and woke up
Petersen (T. 101), who was "pretty drunk" (T. 79). He wrote out
her check for her, which she signed (T. 78). Then she grabbed
her dog and a sack and the backgammon board (T. 101) and went out
to the cab.

She told Steeley where to go in Layton and

expressed no concerns about returning there (T. 103). When they
arrived at her house, she asked Steeley to come in and she would
give him the check (T. 104).
Steeley accompanied Petersen into the house and sat
down on a stool in the upper level kitchen (T. 105). Bertrand
came walking down the hallway toward the kitchen in his underwear
and asked Petersen in a jealous way, "Who's this, your new fuck?"
(T. 145), to which Steeley replied that he was only a cab driver
(T. 106). Bertrand's question made Petersen angry because it was
disrespectful (T. 590), and she retorted, "I don't have to take
this shit.

Get out."

(T. 147), to which Bertrand responded

something like "Okay, I will.

You let me get my little girl."

(T- 147).
Petersen went down the hallway toward the bedrooms and
Bertrand followed her out of Steeley's sight (T. 107; 147).
Steeley heard a crashing sound like pictures falling (T. 108) and
then heard choking and gasping sounds (T.149) and the following
exchange:
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Woman: "Don't choke me.••
Man: "I wouldn't choke you if you didn't
bite me.••
Woman: "I wouldn't bite you if you didn't
choke me.••
(T. 149). Petersen then came down the hallway toward Steeley and
grabbed the telephone on the kitchen wall (T. 110) and called the
Layton City Police Department.

She asked Steeley to stay until

police arrived (T. Ill)/ and then had the following conversation
with the dispatcher at 4:22 a.m.:
Dispatcher:

Layton City Emergency.

Peterson:

Yes, I would like to

Dispatcher:

What's the problem?

Peterson:

Uh, let's put it this way, a, uh, domestic
problems.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

1178 West 2525 North.

Dispatcher:

OK. And where's—is this where the
problem's at?

Peterson:

Yes it is.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

It's between two people who aren't
married. Linda Peterson who is a home
owner and Mitch Bertrand.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

No.

Dispatcher:

I'm sorry.

Peterson:

Two females—I wish.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

Yes it is.

Dispatcher:

OK. And who—I'm sorry—give me the names
of the people again.

right now.

Where at?

And who is it between?

Is it two females?

OK.

Is this at your home?

-ft-

Peterson:

My name is Linda Peterson.
homeowner.

I am a

Dispatcher:

OK, and what's the problem?

Peterson:

He's gonna get his ass out of here real
quick.

Dispatcher:

Ok.

Peterson:

Mitch Bertrand.

Dispatcher:

Burton?

Peterson:

Bertrand.

Dispatcher:

OK. And is this a boyfriend of yours or
an ex-husband, o r —

Peterson:

It's a boyfriend.

Dispatcher:

OK.
it?

Peterson:

No.

Dispatcher:

OK, u h —

Peterson:

I'm gettin' tired of gettin' choked to
death and shit, you know.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

Yes he has.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

Yes he is.

Dispatcher:

Any alcohol or weapons involved?

Peterson:

I have no idea.

Dispatcher:

What do you mean you have no idea?
have—

Peterson:

— I don't know if he's drank or not.

Dispatcher:

Have you been drinking?

Peterson:

Yeah.

Who's—what's the guy's name?

B-E-R-T-R-A-N-D.

And you don't want him there, is that

So he has assaulted you then?

Is he still there now?

I

Dispatcher:

OK. Umm, you—so he hasn't assaulted you
with anything, but rather than—with all
the— (unintelligible)

Peterson:

He chokes me to death, honey.

Dispatcher:

OK. Well, I just need this to find out
for the officer's safety.

Peterson:

OK.

Dispatcher:

Umm, does he have a vehicle there?

Peterson:

Yes he does.

Dispatcher:

OK, umm, did he have a place to stay
tonight, or —

Peterson:

I have no idea and I don't fuckin' care.

Dispatcher:

OK.

Peterson:

Thank you.

Dispatcher:

OK, bye-bye.

OK, well we'll send an officer over.

End of tape.

The time is 4:24.
4
(R. 3-5; Plaintiff's Ex. 26). When Petersen hung up the phone,
Bertrand, who had gotten dressed, came down the hallway with a
box of toys in his arms on his way downstairs and asked Steeley
if he would mind moving the cab out of the driveway (T. 111-12;
597).

According to Steeley, his tone "wasn't real mellow, but it

wasn't real loud" (T. 113). Petersen saw Bertrand go and start
packing and taking his things out of the house (T. 552), and she
thought he had come out with clothes on a hanger (T. 595-96).

At

that point, Petersen believed Bertrand was leaving (T. 597).
Steeley walked down one flight of steps to the front
door landing and went outside to move the cab, closing the door

The tape recording of this conversation was played for the jury
(T. 198; Plaintiff's Ex. 25).
-in.

behind him.

Petersen said she went downstairs at this point to

make sure that Bertrand wasn't packing up her possessions from
the family room (T. 553). When Steeley returned to the front
door and knocked two to three minutes later (T. 116; 153), he
heard the sound of toys crashing and screaming (T. 117).
Petersen subsequently told her neighbor she had either kicked or
knocked the box of toys out of Bertrand's hands as he was
5
bringing it downstairs (T. 644).
When Steeley opened the front door and went in, there
were toys scattered on the landing, as well as on the steps down
to the garage and family room area and the steps up to the
kitchen and bedroom area (T. 153). He saw Petersen and Bertrand
fighting at the bottom of the lower set of steps (T. 154).
Bertrand had her by the hair and hit the side of her head into
the wall (T. 118), while shaking her (T. 120), calling her a
whore and a slut (T. 118; 155), and hollering two or three times,
"Get her off of me" (T. 120). Petersen broke away and got one or
two steps up, when Bertrand grabbed her by the hair and banged
her head five or six times against the front door, which was
pushed open against the wall, while again screaming "Get her off
of me." (T. 120-21).

Steeley did not physically intervene

(T.181), although he was standing just outside the doorway, but
told Bertrand to let her go (T. 181). Meanwhile, Petersen was
slapping Bertrand (T. 178; 180) and yelling, "Let me go" (T.
121).

Steeley also told police during their investigation that the
box of toys had been knocked out of Bertrand's hands (T. 184).
Petersen testified at trial, however, that Bertrand had dropped

Bertrand then released Petersen (T. 121; 158), and she
ran past Steeley and upstairs (T. 122), Bertrand walked down a
few steps and and stood at the bottom of the lower steps, an area
that was "kind of dark" (T. 122) and "real dim" (T. 159). He
began picking up the scattered toys (T. 181; 191; 600). Petersen
went into the kitchen and grabbed a kitchen knife with a 12 cm
(5") blade (T. 364, 605; R. 7). Petersen returned quickly to the
top flight of stairs and leaned over the railing to the basement
area, waving or lunging with the knife (T. 163; 185) "to threaten
him, to tell him to get out of there now" (T. 606), though she
did not see Bertrand (T. 606). She continued down .the first
flight of steps, "shooting by" Steeley (T. 159; 164; 188) "pretty
fast" (T. 124), while yelling "Get out"

(T. 124; 163) and

holding the knife in front of her in her right hand (T. 161;
187) .
Petersen continued down the lower flight of stairs with
her back to Steeley (T. 167; 187), who could not really see the
area at the bottom of the stairs very clearly (T. 125; 159).
When Petersen reached the third or fourth step down from the
landing, Steeley saw a shadow come around the corner at the
bottom of the lower stairs in an upright position (T. 126; 166),
and then heard the following exchange as he started down the
stairs (T. 127):
Bertrand:

"Oh God, she stabbed me."

Petersen:

"Now leave."

Bertrand:

"I can't drive." (T.168).
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Bertrand fell to the floor and Steeley picked up the
knife at his feet (T. 128; 168) and took it upstairs and put it
in the kitchen sink.

Steeley went back downstairs and put a

washcloth on Bertrand's hand because he saw blood there and then
put a towel on Bertrand's chest when he saw a trickle of blood
there (T. 129).
Steeley then heard the truck door opening in the garage
and heard a little girl calling "Daddy" (T. 129). Steeley went
out into the garage and stayed with the four-year-old there until
the police arrived moments later (T. 131).
Officer John Libbert, responding to the Layton City
police dispatch, walked up the driveway and saw the garage door
open and Bertrand's pickup truck, with the tailgate down and
personal belongings in the truck bed (T. 205; 207). He
approached Steeley, who said, "There's a real weird situation
here."

(T. 208). Officer Libbert heard a woman's loud voice

coming from inside the house, but could not understand the loud
speech (T. 208-09).

Then Petersen walked out of the lower level

of the house into the garage, wearing blood-spattered sweatpants
and carrying a can of beer in her right hand (T. 209; 133).
Her balance was poor, her speech was slurred (T. 209; 639), and
she did not seem upset (T. 252 639); she took a drink from her
beer as she emerged from the house (T. 209; 639).

Although Petersen claimed to not remember getting the beer
after the stabbing, she admitted that to do so she would have had
to walk by Bertrand#s body, go over to the refrigerator in the
family room, and then walk by the body again to enter the garage
(T. 614-615).
-13-

Petersen gave her name to the officer and, when asked
what the problem was, said, "He was choking me and I had to
defend myself.

. . . I did it in self-defense" (T. 209-210),

which she repeated several times before her arrest (T. 237).
Libbert looked at Petersen's neck and saw no redness; he looked
at her face and saw no injuries (T. 248).
Libbert then looked through the open door into the
lower level of the house and saw a body.

He asked Petersen what

she had done in self-defense and she stated she had used a knife
and stabbed him, at the same time making an overhand motion with
her left hand (she was still holding the beer in her right hand)
(T. 211). Officer Libbert called for police and medical backup
and went to examine the body at the bottom of the inside stairs,
finding a stab wound in the chest and no vital signs (T. 212).
He saw toys scattered under and around Bertrand's body and on the
landing (T. 218). He found blood on the stairwell wall above the
second or third step from the bottom of the lower flight of
stairs (T. 229-230; 242).
As Libbert came back out into the garage, he asked
Petersen who else was in the home besides her and the victim and
the little girl.

Petersen responded that her dog was there and

sarcastically asked the officer, "Do you want to talk to the
fucking dog?" (T. 213). Libbert then instructed her to put her
beer on the trunk of the car in the garage, and he arrested her.
(T. 214). She asked if Bertrand was dead, and Libbert said yes,
which she seemed to comprehend (T. 251; 641).
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During transport to the police station, Petersen told
Officer Dale Bowker that she and Bertrand had had a fight and he
pushed her around and tried to choke her to death (T. 285). She
smelled strongly of alcohol and her eyes were bloodshot, but she
seemed coherent (T. 279). Bowker saw no injuries on Petersen, no
redness or markings on her neck, but her hair was messed up (T.
280; 293). She repeated that she had stabbed him and that she
had had to defend herself (T. 286-87), and she expressed no
concern for the victim (T. 293). As he placed her in the holding
room at the police station, "she didn't really seeem bothered by
the fact that somebody had been stabbed."

(T. 279).

When he returned to the holding room to interview her
sometime later, Petersen complained of chest pains and was
hyperventilating (T. 298-99).

She was taken by ambulance to a

hospital emergency room and examined by Dr. Allen Condie at 6:45
a.m. (T. 443). Dr. Condie had her breathe into a paper bag and
then into a non-rebreathing mask as treatment for her
hyperventilation, which he diagnosed as being caused by emotional
upset and not physical injury (T. 443; 446). He gave her 10 mg
of Valium, and her breathing returned to normal in 15-20 minutes
(T. 445). Dr. Condie did a full head-to-toe physical examination
of Petersen and found no significant trauma (T. 445). He found
no red marks, lacerations, abrasions, or bruises on her neck,
chest, back or anywhere on her body, as well as no swelling on
her head, which would be expected unless the trauma was minor (T.
445-47).

At 7:30 a.m., he came back and asked Petersen if she

hurt anywhere, and she said no (T. 447). He did another complete
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examination of her body at that time and the results were the
7
same (T. 447; 445).
After Petersen dressed, Officer Bowker
took a photograph of her face and neck (Plaintiff's Ex. 2) and
specifically looked at her face, neck and head.

The only injury

he saw there was a very small puncture wound under the left ear
lobe that matched up with the post hole of Petersen's earring
(T. 302).
Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on Bertrand, described him as being 6' tall, 140 lbs.,
and of slender build (T. 369). Dr. Grey found two sharp force
injuries, which are those made by a sharp-edged or cutting type
of instrument (T. 347). The first was the lethal stabbing injury
(T. 364). In creating the 5 V

deep stab wound (T. 361), the

knife blade had first gone through Bertrand's sternum, struck his
heart sack, passed through the right ventricle, exited the back
of the heart, and completely severed his esophagus (T. 357). The
wound path was slightly downwards and slightly right to left
through the breast bone.

Dr. Grey testified it would take a

significant amount of force to drive a blade through a bone like
that (T.362), which a 5', 103 lb. woman was capable of exerting
"if she put energy into the blow" (T. 371).

Petersen's personal physician, Dr. Charles Berwald, testified
for the defense about an examination of her on September 6, four
days after the stabbing. He found one abrasion, 1 cm in length,
along her front hairline and six bruises, 1-3 cm x 1-4 cm in
size, none of which were on the sides or back of her head (T.
517). Dr. Berwald admitted, however, that the bruises could have
been inflicted as recently as 24 to 48 hours before his
examination of Petersen (T. 520).
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Dr. Grey examined the sweatshirt and pants Petersen was
wearing at the time of the stabbing (Plaintiff's Ex.23) and found
several small droplets of blood on the left arm of the shirt and
a small area of smeared blood on the right shirt arm (T. 367).
On the sweatpants, there was an extensive pattern of unsmeared
droplets of blood that had struck the front of the pant legs and
the groin area at a downward angle (T.368).
Dr. Grey found the injury to Bertrand, the wound path,
and the blood spatter pattern consistent with a scenario in which
a 5'1" person with the knife was above the 6' victim on the
stairs and made a thrusting forward motion (T. 370-72).

However,

he found those same facts inconsistent with a scenario in which
the knife holder was stationary and the victim ran into the knife
and impaled himself (T. 373-74).

First, it would be very

difficult to hold the knife tightly and steadily enough to travel
as it did, given the amount of force the victim would have had to
exert against the knife for it to go through the sternum; the arm
in which the knife was held would be knocked away and the
person's grip on the knife lost (T. 374). Secondly, because of
the momentum that would be necessary in order to impale on the
knife, the victim would continue falling forward onto the person
with the knife, creating a smeared, irregular blood pattern on
the latter's clothing, which was not present here (T. 374; 38889).

Dr. Grey concluded that the knife was driven into

Bertrand's body, instead of the body being driven onto the knife
blade (T. 407).
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Jim Bell, an experienced blood stain analyst, described
the blood droplet pattern on Petersen's clothes as uniform and
unsmeared (T. 416), the result of the victim's arterial blood
spurting out in an arc and dropping on the clothing at a slight
angle (T. 417-18).

Bell agreed with Dr. Grey that there would

have been contact between Bertrand and Petersen if he had impaled
himself on the knife because he would have continued moving
forward from his momentum even after impalement (T. 421-23).
There was no such contact, Bell determined, because contact would
have unquestionably produced a large amount of heavy blood
smearing on the front of Petersen's sweatpants (T. 422-23).
Bell also concluded Bertrand could not have come around a corner
fast enough and hard enough, then up one or two stairs, to impale
himself on the 5" knife blade because of the force that would be
needed to penetrate the sternum (T. 423), as well as the absence
of smeared blood on Petersen's clothing (T. 421).
In addition to the stab wound that killed Bertrand, Dr.
Grey also found a second sharp force injury:

fresh sharp-edged

cut wounds, caused by a knife or something similar (T. 393), on
the backs of his right index finger and right middle finger (T.
353; Plaintiff's Ex. 33) and a superficial cut on the back of the
right elbow (T. 349). Grey described these as defensive wounds,
i.e., those that look like they were sustained by the victim in
an attempt to ward off or protect himself from attack (T. 355).
In addition, the autopsy revealed fresh abrasions on two of
Bertrand's fingers, abrasion and bruising on the back of his
right elbow, a bruise on the upper left side of his abdomen,
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small scrapes on his left cheek and left arm, and a fresh bite
mark on his right forearm (T. 349-50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to
acquit at the close of the State's case-in-chief.

At that point,

the State was only required to establish a prima facie case by
putting forth some evidence of every element of its cause of
action.

Case law clearly holds that the State need not prove the

absence of self-defense as part of its prima facie case of
homicide.
The court should decline to reach the merits of
appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's determination that she did not act in selfdefense in stabbing Bertrand.

Appellant has failed to marshall

all the evidence supportive of that determination and has not
demonstrated why that evidence, even if viewed in a light
favorable to the jury's verdict, is insufficient.
If the court chooses to reach the merits of appellant's
claim of insufficient evidence, there was ample evidence from
which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
appellant's stabbing of Bertrand was not justified by selfdefense.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
LACK OF SELF-DEFENSE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF A
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF HOMICIDE WHICH THE
PROSECUTION HAD TO ESTABLISH IN ITS CASE-INCHIEF IN ORDER TO SURVIVE APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO ACQUIT
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her
motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case-in-chief
because the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she had not acted in self-defense (Brief of Appellant at 1920).
A motion for acquittal is governed by Utah Code Ann. §
77-17-3 (1990), which requires discharge of a criminal defendant
"[w]hen it appears to the court that there is riot sufficient
evidence to put a defendant to his defense," and Utah R. Crim. P.
17(o):
At the conclusion of the evidence by the
prosecution . . . the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the
ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged
therein or any lesser included offense.
These provisions arise from the basic notion that a defendant
need not go forward with any evidence in his or her defense
unless the prosecution first presents a prima facie case, i.e.,
some evidence of every element of the crime charged or a lesser
included offense.

State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983);

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976); State v. Strieby,
790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Evidence sufficient to

establish a prima facie case need only conform to the statutory
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definition of the crime charged, Romero, 554 P.2d at 217, and the
elements of the crime consist of "(a) conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct; and (b) the requisite
mental state."

Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2) (1990); see

also State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985).
Appellant was charged with second degree murder, a
criminal homicide in which the actor
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, . . . commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another; [or]
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, . . .
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk
of death to another and thereby causes the
death of another[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (1990).

The statute sets forth the

prohibited conduct, its results, and the requisite intent as the
elements of the crime the State must establish as its prima facie
case.

Appellant does not dispute that the State in this case

presented "some evidence" of each statutory element of second
degree murder; rather, she contends that the absence of selfdefense was an additional element of the crime charged that the
State was required to, but failed to, prove in its case-in-chief.
In State v. Knollf 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985), the
defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1982), by
describing criminal homicide as an "unlawful" killing, made the
absence of self-defense an element of the crime of manslaughter,
one category of homicide.

Noting that self-defense is a

justification for a killing, the Utah Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that the absence of self-defense is not one of
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the prima facie elements of homicide.

Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.

Accordingly, it is not an element that must be proved by the
State in order to survive a motion for acquittal at the close of
the State's evidence in a homicide prosecution, as this court
recently held in State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100. Otherwise,
the State would be forced "to prove a negative in a homicide
offense, a burden the law does not often impose."

Knoll, 712

P.2d at 214; accord Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100 n.l.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Strieby by contending
that self-defense was not "raised" by the State's case-in-chief
against Strieby.

If it had been, Appellant suggests, the court

would have held that the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, as part of its prima facie case, that Strieby
did not act in self-defense (Br. of App. at 19-20).

This is a

misreading of the clear holdings of Knoll and Strieby, noted
above.

Although Knoll requires the jury to be instructed on the

issue of self-defense and requires the State to prove its
absence beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue has been raised
by the evidence presented at trial, Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215, it is
simply inappropriate to test the sufficiency of the State's
evidence on this point in a motion to acquit at the close of the
g
The description of criminal homicide no longer refers to an
"unlawful" killings
A person commits criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental
state otherwise specified in the statute
defining the offense, causes the death of
another . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1990).
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State's case-in-chief.

Furthermore, Appellant's argument

mischaracterizes the evidence before the trial court at the time
of Strieby's motion to acquit. As this court pointed out in its
opinion, Strieby admitted to causing the death of her husband.
790 P.2d at 100. Thus, the only disputed issue at trial was
whether that action was justified by self-defense.

Defendant

Strieby's version of what happened, namely, that she had shot him
in self-defense, was raised in the prosecution's case-in-chief by
the admission of State's exhibit 14, a transcription of the
recorded statement she gave to the police describing the events
leading up to the shooting, including the beatings she was
subjected to (Record on Appeal in State v. Strieby, No. 890124CA, at 136, cited in Brief of Appellee State of Utah at 4-6).
In short, the law clearly does not require the State to
prove a lack of self-defense as part of its prima facie homicide
case before a defendant is put to her proof, even if there is
some evidence in the State's case-in-chief raising the issue of
self-defense.

See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. At this point in the

proceeding, the State was only required to present some

If Appellant had moved for a directed verdict after the defense
rested, the trial court would then have had to determine if there
was sufficient evidence warranting sending the case to the jury.
See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). Because
the State must prove the absence of self-defense once the issue
is raised, Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214, the trial court would then
have had to determine if there was some evidence presented from
which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant had not acted in self-defense. Whether a killing was
justified by self-defense is for the jury's determination, unless
the evidence of it is so compelling that all reasonable minds
must conclude that the means and force used were reasonably
necessary to defend against imminent serious bodily injury.
State v. Lawf 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (1944).
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believable evidence of each statutory element of the crime with
which appellant was charged, or of a lesser included offense.
Because the State was not required to prove a lack of selfdefense in order to make out its prima facie homicide case, the
trial court properly denied appellant's motion to acquit.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
APPELLANT'S INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE SHE
HAS NEITHER MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
A LACK OF SELF-DEFENSE NOR DEMONSTRATED ITS
INSUFFICIENCY AS A MATTER OF LAW
In State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 32 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), issued two months before the filing of -Appellant's
brief, this court expressly adopted for criminal appeals of jury
verdicts the "marshaling" requirement theretofore applied to
civil appeals and criminal bench trials. After Moore, a criminal
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a jury's verict of guilty must marshal all of the evidence that
supports the jury's findings and then demonstrate that, even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the jury's decision,
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's findings.
The court explained its reasons for adopting this rule:
The process of marshaling the evidence
serves the important function of reminding
litigants and appellate courts of the broad
deference owed to the fact finder at trial.
Such deference is especially appropriate
where the fact finder is a jury, whose common
sense is a valued buffer between the parties.
. . • Marshaling also aids the appellate
courts in deliberations and in the opinionwriting process.
Id.
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Id.

Requiring a defendant convicted by a jury to marshal
the evidence supporting the jury's determination of guilt is a
necessary concomitant of the appellate courts' limited power to
review jury verdicts.

See id. at 31. The applicable standard of

review in such cases requires an appellate court to view all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct.
1837 (1990); Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.

In order to do so,

the court must have all of that evidence presented to it as its
starting point for appellate review.

A defendant who fails to

marshal all of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict gives
the appellate court an incomplete picture of the evidence before
the jury, one that is inappropriately skewed to favor what
defendant believes the jury should have found, not what it did
find.

In such a circumstance, the appellate court is being asked

by a convicted defendant to overrule a jury decision reached
after taking into account evidence of which the appellate court
is kept ignorant by the defendant.

Furthermore, a defendant who

fails to fulfill the Moore marshaling burden merely foists that
considerable task onto the appellate court or the State.
This case presents a prototypical example of the kind
of insufficiency argument the rule adopted in Moore is designed
to preclude.

In her brief, Appellant selectively extracts

testimony from a 700-page trial transcript that she claims should
have led to a finding that she was justified in killing Michel
Bertrand.

Although the jury in this case, after more than eight

hours of deliberations, determined that Appellant did not stab
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Bertrand in self-defense, Appellant reargues her version of the
evidence to this court, asking it to be a super-jury and reach
the opposite conclusion.

However, as this court reiterated in

Moore, it is not the appellate court's function to act as a trial
court.

Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.

"The jury, not the

appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness
credibility; so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences
support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them."

Id.

The standard of review applicable to insufficiency
claims requires this court to look at all the evidence that
supports the jury's determination that Appellant's killing of
Bertrand was not justified by self-defense.

Appellant has

nonetheless failed to present all of that evidence to the court.
If the rule adopted in Moore is to have any teeth in it, it
should be enforced in this case to preclude consideration on
appeal of Appellant's insufficiency argument.
POINT III
IF REACHED, THE COURT SHOULD REJECT
APPELLANT'S INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE THERE
IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A JURY
COULD HAVE CONCLUDED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT APPELLANT'S KILLING OF BERTRAND
WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY SELF-DEFENSE
Once the issue of self-defense is raised during the
course of a criminal trial, whether by the defendant's or
prosecution's evidence, it is the State's burden to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense.
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. Thus, as the jury in this case was
instructed (R. 85), a defendant is entitled to an acquittal if
the evidence presented at trial creates a reasonable doubt as to
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whether the defendant did or did not act in self-defense. J^d. at
215; State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (1974).
The elements of self-defense as a justification for a
killing are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990):
(1) A person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to defend himself or
a third person against such other's imminent
use of unlawful force; however, a person is
justified in using force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person, or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using
force under the circumstances specified in
paragraph (1) of this section if he:
(a) Initially provokes the use of force
against himself with the intent to use
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm
upon the assailant; or
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing,
or fleeing after the commission or
attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in
a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws
from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his
intent to do so and the other
notwithstanding continues or threatens to
continue the use of unlawful force.
Under this statute, Appellant was justified in using deadly force
only if an assault by Bertrand with unlawful force was imminent
and only if she reasonably believed that deadly force was
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to her.
Because there was some evidence presented at trial on which
reasonable minds could differ over what Appellant actually
believed, whether that belief was reasonable, and whether serious
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bodily injury to her was imminent at the time she acted, the
determination of whether she acted in self-defense was for the
jury.

State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (1944).

"Life is not so cheap that one may use weapons on another which
are quite likely to cause death unless the danger of being
overcome is so great as to justify their use.
question for the jury . . . ."

This is usually a

Id.

As noted above, the jury's determination that
Appellant's killing of Bertrand was not justified by self-defense
must be given great deference by this court on appellate review.
Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The jury's finding that
Appellant did not act in self-defense cannot be disturbed on
appeal if, after viewing the evidence and its inferences in a
light favorable to the jury's finding, there is any evidence and
its reasonable inferences from which the jury could have reached
that finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Gardner, 789 P.2d at

289; Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The appropriate inquiry on
appeal from a jury verdict is not whether there is evidence that
would have supported a contrary finding, as Appellant seems to
argue, or whether the appellate court would have reached the same
finding of no self-defense as the jury did based on the evidence
before it.

In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1985).

It is clear from the verdict of guilty of second degree
murder that the jury accepted the testimony of Dr. Grey and the
blood stain analyst and disbelieved Appellant, rejecting her
claim that she did not take affirmative action to stab Bertrand,
but that he had merely collided with her and accidently impaled

himself on the knife in her hand (T. 610-11).

It is impossible

to know which element of self-defense the jury found lacking as
justification for Appellant's action in stabbing Bertrand, and
there is a myriad of possibilities.

Perhaps the jurors thought

that her use of deadly force was unreasonably excessive in light
of the minor injuries she had incurred, according to the doctor
who examined her within a few hours of the choking incident and
the head banging incident.

Or perhaps the jury concluded that,

although she was justified in arming herself with the knife, she
was not justified in going after Bertrand and using it, a
distinction ignored by Appellant.

Although Appellant paints a

simple picture of herself as an innocent woman defending her life
from an abusive boyfriend, the jury looked at those assaultive
physical encounters on the night of September 1, 1989, in
conjunction with the circumstances immediately preceeding the
fatal stabbing in order to determine her belief, the
reasonableness of that belief, and the reasonableness of her act
of stabbing Bertrand to defend herself.
There is substantial evidence that would support a
finding that any belief Appellant had, at the time of the
stabbing, that she was in imminent danger of serious injury even
after she armed herself with the 5" knife was not reasonable
because:

(a) Bertrand had let her go at Steeley's insistence

during the last altercation on the stairs, which the jury could
believe she had precipitated by going down the stairs and
knocking or kicking the box from Bertrand's hands; (b) in
addition to being armed, Appellant was not alone with Bertrand
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but had a male third party present to intervene who had already
done so verbally, with success; (c) the police had already been
called and Appellant knew they were on their way; (d) before the
incident on the stairs, Bertrand had gotten dressed, opened the
garage door, taken his four-year-old out and put her into his
pickup truck, and started packing up his belongings and put some
in the back of the truck; (e) Appellant heard Bertrand ask
Steeley in a normal voice to move his cab out of the driveway,
presumably so he could back his truck out; (e) after the incident
on the stairs, Bertrand did not pursue Appellant but instead went
the opposite direction and starting picking up scattered toys to
continue his departure from the house; and (f) there was no
evidence of any action or threats by Bertrand to attack Appellant
once he let her go on the steps.
There is also substantial evidence from which the jury
could have concluded that Appellant did not have any belief,
reasonable or not, that deadly force was necessary because of
imminent danger of serious bodily injury from Bertrand when she
stabbed him.

The jury could have instead concluded that she was

not defending herself at all, but was acting offensively out of
drunken anger:

(a) she was a hothead whose temper was shorter

when she had been drinking, and she was "pretty drunk" when she
left Toponce's house at about 3:30 or 4:00 a.m., less than an
hour before the stabbing, after splitting a bottle of rum; (b)
she had in the past attacked Bertrand physically, even without
provocation; (c) the tone of her call to the police, even though
it was immediately after the choking incident, is not one of a
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woman afraid for her life, but one of a smart aleck who is very
angry at her boyfriend; (d) after she called the police and asked
Steeley to stick around, and Steeley left the house to move his
cab out of the driveway, she did not stay upstairs away from
Bertrand, but instead went down to where he was and kicked the
box of toys out of his hand, interrupting his departure and
provoking the incident on the lower stairs, which is consistent
with his yelling to Steeley, "Get her off of me"; (e) after she
armed herself with the knife, she did not stand her ground to
defend herself and wait for any further advance on her or attack
(or for the arrival of the police), she ran down the stairs in
pursuit of Bertrand, brandishing a knife and angrily yelling at
him to threaten him, pursuing him down the stairs "to show him
that he wasn't going to punch [her] around anymore" (T. 557) and
becoming an aggressor; (f) when she encountered Bertrand coming
around the corner of the steps, as she expected to (T. 558), she
didn't just threaten him with the knife and tell him to stay
away—she thrust the knife into and through his breast bone with
enough force to go completely through his heart and sever his
esophagus, after first striking him with the knife in a way that
caused defensive wounds on the back of his right hand as he took
action to protect himself.
The jury could also have determined that Appellant's
stabbing of Bertrand was affirmative conduct and not a defensive
action by assessing her state of mind at the time, as evidenced
by her own words and conduct during the stabbing and afterwards.
Immediately after the stabbing, she did not react the way one
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would reasonably expect from a woman who has, either accidently
or out of fear in self-defense, delivered a mortal wound to a
lover.

When Bertrand cried out, "Oh God, she stabbed me,"

Petersen coldly responded, "Now leave." (T. 168). After Bertrand
and the knife fell to the floor, she did not look to see how
badly he was injured, or even call for any medical assistance
(T.612).

Instead, the stepped around Bertrand's bleeding body,

went into the family room and got herself another beer.

When she

walked back by the body and emerged into the garage and met
Officer Libbert, she calmly took a pull on her beer and told him
in a slurred voice that she had had to defend herself because
Bertrand was choking her.

Then, consistently demonstrating anger

instead of remorse about the stabbing, she makes a sarcastic
comment to the officer about whether he wants to talk to her dog.
Although told while still at her house that Bertrand was dead,
she didn't even get worked about it about it until almost two
hours after the stabbing—after she had been arrested and placed
in a holding room before being booked for murder, after she had
had enough time to sober up and contemplate her own future.
When all of the evidence presented to the jury in this
case and its reasonable inferences—not just Appellant's
expurgated version—is viewed in a light favorable to the jury's
verdict of guilty, it is apparent that the State met its burden
of proof by presenting, not just some evidence, but substantial
evidence on which the jury could find the following beyond a
reasonable doubt:

(1) that Appellant was guilty of second degree

murder because she had killed Bertrand by stabbing him in the
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chest with a 5" knife blade, an act clearly dangerous to human
life, intending to cause him serious bodily injury, Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-203(1)(b); or (b) that she thereby knowingly engaged
in conduct creating a grave risk of death to Bertrand, acting
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c); and (c) that her action in
stabbing Bertrand in the chest, which resulted in his death, was
not justified by self-defense.

Accordingly, the court should

reject on the merits Appellant's claim that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of an absence
of self-defense.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this
court affirm the judgment of conviction.
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